The trick is to build and deploy "loudly", systems which are visible deterrents for terrorists acts. The system described here can be implemented in any country because the solution is scalable.
Every resident in the country, and even a visitor to the country, should have a record created in a "REFERRALS DATABASE". This database can have millions or billion records (so even China and India are not excluded).
Referrals are people who have vouched for the subject (resident or the visitor). Each referee should provide a confidence score of the subject's probability of being or becoming a potential terrorist.
Each subject would be given a label in the database through an algorithm which would analyse the scores given by the referees and the missing data of the subject. The label instances would be:
Safe (not a likely terrorist)
Suspect (could be radicalised and become a terrorist)
Tag (is radicalised and a potential terrorist or has vital missing data and therefore in need of tagging)
Those labeled as "Tag" should be tagged (using active RFID non-removable bracelets) and subjected to tight surveillance, including geo fencing. Such people should be allowed to move only in designated areas or routes, and any deviation should alert security forces and trigger an arrest.
Those labeled "Suspect" should be asked to refresh referrals scores periodically (every 6 months or 2 years or some interval in-between depending upon the country's budget and propensity to rein in terrorists).
1. First the RESIDENTS' database:
1.1 The identifier in each RESIDENT'S record should be biometrics linked. So the Aadhar id qualifies in India. If the id does not have biometrics already linked, the country must collect that data of the subject (all fingerprints at least, both iris images desirable).
1.2 The subject's attributes should include - name, date of birth, place of birth, mobile number and email id (which have been authenticated with the identifier, for e.g. these should be consistent with the same data provided in Aadhar database - I am not suggesting stealing, or borrowing, this data from Aadhar database). A person who does not have either a mobile or email should be marked to "Tag".
1.3 REFEREE's scores - there should be 3 to 10 sets and each set of data should include identifier of the referee and his/her score on a 0 to 100 scale - 0 would indicate the referee's full confidence that the subject is not a potential terrorist at all, and a score of 100 would indicate the subject is radicalised, and is a terrorist, or a sure potential terrorist. There should be three to ten referees' scores, who are NOT themselves "Tag" type, depending upon the country's propensity to rein in terrorists and the budget allocated for building this system. The referee ids and scores would be initially provided by the subject himself or herself. The system would then authenticate those by obtaining confirmations from each referee by any convenient method - SMS, email or online.
2. The VISITOR'S database:
2.1 The identifier in each VISITOR's record will be Passport + Country issuing the passport.
2.2 Same as the data in item 1.2
2.3 Same as the data in item 1.3
The algorithm that delivers the verdict, Safe, Suspect or Tag, would evaluate the average scores of confidence by assigning weights to referees.
The above system would utilise advanced machine learning and communications technologies. Referees would be sent SMS and asked to confirm the scores input by the subject on their behalf.
Referees would be held responsible for patently wrong scores. Under a new legislation, a subject caught in an act of terrorism and assigned a score of less than 10 by any referee would automatically result in arraignment of the referee. Such a policy will be a deterrent to referees giving liberal scores. It would also act as a deterrent to would be terrorists, to indulge in terrorist acts which would bring harm to their friends and relatives. A terrorist is not afraid to lose his/her life but what about his/her friends' and relatives' lives?
The cost of the above system could be dropped by excluding such people who are considered "Safe". However, the drawback is that such categorisation attempts could get politicised easily. A centralised database of profiles of past terrorists could be built and analysed to determine common characteristics and any resident with matching characteristics would be required to register on the above REFERRALS DATABASE. For e.g. {all muslims or all those who have visited certain countries} AND {who are above 18 years but less than 80 years of age} could be considered "not safe" and ordered to register with REFERRALS DATABASE.
Every resident in the country, and even a visitor to the country, should have a record created in a "REFERRALS DATABASE". This database can have millions or billion records (so even China and India are not excluded).
Referrals are people who have vouched for the subject (resident or the visitor). Each referee should provide a confidence score of the subject's probability of being or becoming a potential terrorist.
Each subject would be given a label in the database through an algorithm which would analyse the scores given by the referees and the missing data of the subject. The label instances would be:
Safe (not a likely terrorist)
Suspect (could be radicalised and become a terrorist)
Tag (is radicalised and a potential terrorist or has vital missing data and therefore in need of tagging)
Those labeled as "Tag" should be tagged (using active RFID non-removable bracelets) and subjected to tight surveillance, including geo fencing. Such people should be allowed to move only in designated areas or routes, and any deviation should alert security forces and trigger an arrest.
Those labeled "Suspect" should be asked to refresh referrals scores periodically (every 6 months or 2 years or some interval in-between depending upon the country's budget and propensity to rein in terrorists).
1. First the RESIDENTS' database:
1.1 The identifier in each RESIDENT'S record should be biometrics linked. So the Aadhar id qualifies in India. If the id does not have biometrics already linked, the country must collect that data of the subject (all fingerprints at least, both iris images desirable).
1.2 The subject's attributes should include - name, date of birth, place of birth, mobile number and email id (which have been authenticated with the identifier, for e.g. these should be consistent with the same data provided in Aadhar database - I am not suggesting stealing, or borrowing, this data from Aadhar database). A person who does not have either a mobile or email should be marked to "Tag".
1.3 REFEREE's scores - there should be 3 to 10 sets and each set of data should include identifier of the referee and his/her score on a 0 to 100 scale - 0 would indicate the referee's full confidence that the subject is not a potential terrorist at all, and a score of 100 would indicate the subject is radicalised, and is a terrorist, or a sure potential terrorist. There should be three to ten referees' scores, who are NOT themselves "Tag" type, depending upon the country's propensity to rein in terrorists and the budget allocated for building this system. The referee ids and scores would be initially provided by the subject himself or herself. The system would then authenticate those by obtaining confirmations from each referee by any convenient method - SMS, email or online.
2. The VISITOR'S database:
2.1 The identifier in each VISITOR's record will be Passport + Country issuing the passport.
2.2 Same as the data in item 1.2
2.3 Same as the data in item 1.3
The algorithm that delivers the verdict, Safe, Suspect or Tag, would evaluate the average scores of confidence by assigning weights to referees.
The above system would utilise advanced machine learning and communications technologies. Referees would be sent SMS and asked to confirm the scores input by the subject on their behalf.
Referees would be held responsible for patently wrong scores. Under a new legislation, a subject caught in an act of terrorism and assigned a score of less than 10 by any referee would automatically result in arraignment of the referee. Such a policy will be a deterrent to referees giving liberal scores. It would also act as a deterrent to would be terrorists, to indulge in terrorist acts which would bring harm to their friends and relatives. A terrorist is not afraid to lose his/her life but what about his/her friends' and relatives' lives?
The cost of the above system could be dropped by excluding such people who are considered "Safe". However, the drawback is that such categorisation attempts could get politicised easily. A centralised database of profiles of past terrorists could be built and analysed to determine common characteristics and any resident with matching characteristics would be required to register on the above REFERRALS DATABASE. For e.g. {all muslims or all those who have visited certain countries} AND {who are above 18 years but less than 80 years of age} could be considered "not safe" and ordered to register with REFERRALS DATABASE.
