Saturday, March 23, 2024

The most urgent and consequential Election Reforms for India - fixes which are easy, quick and cheap to do

 In a democracy, it is said, the people get the government they deserve. But what if the election process gets or can get compromised (hacked)? What if only one side gets all the resources to campaign and fight elections by tilting "the level playing field"? Both these problems have become manifest in India, and it is unlikely they can be resolved without the intervention of the Supreme Court of India. With what India has now begun to be called a "Flawed Democracy", will very soon turn into a sham democracy or a total autocracy; very far from "Mother of Democracy" boast of PM Modi.

Election Commission of India (ECI), an "independent constitutional authority", has announced India’s 18th Parliamentary Elections in seven phases 19th April through 1st June 2024 (a record duration of 44 days) with results scheduled to be announced three days later. ECI will setup 1.2 million polling booths across 543 Parliamentary Constituencies in which 960 million eligible voters could exercise their franchise. In the 2019 General Elections, 669 Political Parties and 3,469 independent candidates contested, and each one was allotted a unique symbol by the ECI.
ECI uses the Electronic Voting Machine System which has been hyped as the “Gold Standard”. Using the EVM System, the results can be announced within three days or else with manual counting, it may take about a week. The reality is that EVM System uses obsolete technology coupled with Internet and millions of staff to conduct the elections whereas India has the necessary Digital Public Infrastructure to conduct online elections in a fraction of the time and cost.
The 2019 General Elections involved an expense estimated at $ 8 Billion and the 2024 General Elections are projected to cost $ 14 Billion making them the costliest in the world. BJP (Bhartiya Janta Party) the ruling party, is estimated to have outspent ALL other parties put together in 2019. The skew will likely become greater in 2024. This is apparent from the partial disclosure of “white money” BJP mobilised through Electoral Bonds (white money is mobilised via banking channels and black money outside it). The black money every party mobilises and spends in elections is estimated to be 10x times the white money. There is little or no transparency in political funding – it was always fraught with quid pro quo but now it has emerged that extortion by the ruling party is routinely being used. SCI recently ruled EB to be illegal and forced State Bank of India and ECI to publish all details of bonds purchased and encashed by all political parties in the interest of transparency and curbing extortion and quid pro quo.    
With the above background information, let us consider the two problems and fixes one by one.

First, the EVM System which can upend the election results - what are the fixes:

After many curious results in 2019 elections, there have been multiple petitions filed in the Courts including, the Supreme Court of India (SCI) as ECI has either refused meetings sought by Opposition leaders or summarily dismissed all challenges. SCI has either turned down appeals for many of the reforms sought or dismissed them. However, in the past few months, particularly after statistical improbabilities of certain results were highlighted in a research paper, entitled “Democratic Backsliding in the World’s Largest Democracy” by Sabyasachi Das (who resigned afterwards from Ashoka University due to backlash) and also technical repudiations of claims ECI has made - (a) EVM is NOT a standalone system and (b) the VVPAT is NOT an One-Time-Programmable (OTP) device - by Kannan Gopinathan, who had work experience as an engineer with Motorola, as an ex-IAS Government officer and as an ex-Returning Officer (RO is in charge of conducting elections in a district) - the question of hackability has been closely examined and confirmed by many technical and industry experts. Furthermore, demos have shown how the EVM System can be gamed. The opposition to the manner of EVM usage has now picked up steam. ECI itself contradicts both its claims (those repudiated by Kannan Gopinathan) in its presentation and FAQ pages on its website. CCE (Citizens Commission on Elections) and ADR (Association of Democratic Reforms) and others have filed multiple petitions against use of EVMs and SCI has finally agreed to hear these before the end of March’24. Over 7K eminent citizens have signed petitions - these include retired Supreme Court Judges, retired Secretaries of GOI, Lawyers, Activists and Computer Science Professors.  
Just so that we are clear of the terminology, let’s understand what “EVM” is versus “EVM System” - the graphics below are copied from ECI website - red colour annotations are added. In the ECI website pages revised in Feb’24, the “EVM” consists of these three machines (CU, VVPAT and BU):
 



 
To commission the above three machines, the following devices are also employed (not disclosed by ECI in any public document), and most importantly, it is nowhere mentioned by ECI that Laptop needs to be connected via Internet to a central server (presumably belonging to ECI) which has the data of contestants (candidate names, ID, and symbol):
 




It is important to note that within 15 days before polling commences, the “commissioning” must be done: Symbol Loading Unit (SLU) is connected to a laptop for downloading the symbols of candidates from the central server accessible via Internet, then it is inserted into the VVPAT for uploading the same – it is at this moment, a rogue program can infiltrate the VVPAT AND EVM SYSTEM COMPROMISED. The hacker needs to subvert only few field staff – only in those booths which matter to his side. The hackers’ planners undoubtedly have booth level voters’ list – available in public domain; they know which are “sensitive” booths – which can swing the results. As there are over a million EVM Systems to be commissioned, within 15 days, there is an army of field staff hired by ECIL and BEL. Electronic Corporation of India and Bharat Electronics are the two public sector units which supply EVM hardware, firmware, and software. News has emerged that BEL’s board includes 3-4 BJP officers. To say the least, the EVM commissioning process in million plus booths should be a security nightmare for any System Designer. Why ECI has not discussed – the process in which Internet access via a laptop becomes necessary - in either its FAQ or Presentation pages – is a question begging to be asked.
 
It is also ironical that none of the well-known IT tycoons of India has spoken out about the obsolete design and vulnerabilities of the "EVM System". In the meanwhile, ECI is flogging the “invincible EVM” assessments of few IIT Professors (all on Government's payroll) of whom 2 or 3 on their expert committee, hold patents over the VVPAT design. The conflict of interest, as well as the fact that none of these professors are security experts, does not bother the ECI; nor the fact that the software source code is not divulged by ECIL and BEL to ECI. The ECI presentations do not distinguish the "EVM" (three animals) and "EVM System" (six animals with Internet connectivity). One would wonder if ECI is innocent, or it is obfuscating terminologies and hiding the details of commissioning process, which makes the EVM System easily hackable, on purpose.
 
Just as the rewards or stakes of hacking India's elections bear no comparison with hacking of an organisation's or an individual's account, so also the calibre and organisational wherewithal of the former are expected to be many magnitudes higher than the latter. Motivation for subversion of India’s elections can entangle not just trillions of rupees but national security too.
 
 



 
 
 
In the existing process (graphic copied from ECI website), this is what happens (or can happen):
 
  1. An elector (voter) walks into the Polling Station (PS) with an ID proof. S/he walks up to the row of Polling Agents of Political parties, and they tick off the name after verifying his/her name on the voters list. If name is not found, the voter is not allowed to vote. [It is alleged that many voter names are deleted by ECI due to system deficiencies or mala fide designs of the ruling party.]
  2. Indelible ink is smeared with a thin swab on one finger of the eligible voter. [ECI is not sure if the same voter is listed multiple times in different locations (booths) as there is no citizen ID in India at present.]
  3. The voter walks up to the Voting Compartment and waits to press a button on the BU to register his/her vote. The BU has the names of contestants and election symbols adjacent to buttons. Max 16 names per BU - they can be daisy-chained.
  4. The Polling Officer with the CU presses a key to enable the BU to register a vote.
  5. After hearing the audio beep that tells everyone in the room that BU is enabled to accept one vote, the voter pushes a button on the BU to register his/her vote.
  6. A tiny window with one way mirror glass on the VVPAT lights up for 7 seconds during which the voter can see the voting slip with the name of the candidate and symbol! Voter must assume that this slip is not of the previous voter - though there is no telling it could well be of the previous voter who voted for the same candidate - a hacked VVPAT could behave in this manner. If the visible slip is NOT as per the vote cast, then the Voter can complain to the Presiding Officer, and fill out a form to nullify the "wrong vote". There is an intimidating process to rectify the error - which includes actions to "prove" that the machines are misbehaving! Failure to prove the misbehaviour attracts a penalty of Rs.1,000 and imprisonment of three months! VVPAT is supposed to write a record of the vote in the CU; a hacked VVPAT could well write a vote in favour of a candidate of hacker's choice.
  7. The voter having cast his/her vote, walks out trusting the vote is recorded correctly in the CU and that the slip s/he saw in the VVPAT has been indeed dispensed in ballot box. It could well be that the slip has NOT been dispensed in the ballot box nor recorded in the CU. A hacked VVPAT could behave like this - hold all consecutive votes of an adversary party (adversary of the hacker's party) until a vote is cast of a different party - upon that happening, the hacked VVPAT could print and dispense all the votes it had held back, in favour of the hacker's party candidate, and record the votes in the CU consistent with the printed slips!     
CJI recently said, "The great stabilizing force in the country is the purity of the election process". As ECI is clearly aligned with the Government, it is only the SCI that can provide a solution.
What exactly is the fix for the EVM System that will foil the above hacks and is feasible to implement before the polling starts on 19th April 2024? It is really a very easy fix that SCI can order:  
 
CHANGE # 1 The voter should be able to pick up the VVPAT printed slip for verification and physically insert it into the ballot box.
 
CHANGE # 2 The election results should be based on a manual count of 100% slips. In case of discrepancy between the manual count and the CU count, up to two recounts may be ordered. Ultimately, the manual count would prevail and not the CU Count. 
 
CHANGE # 3 After the Polling finishes, the CU and the Ballot Box pairs are transported to the counting station. During the journey:
i) CU and Ballot Box pairs should NOT be transported and stored together and
ii) Oversight of contestants' representatives should be allowed.
 
CHANGE #4 Presently a voter who complains to the Presiding Officer (PO) in the Polling Booth that his/her vote is not properly generated, i.e. the VVPAT has printed the wrong vote - is required to prove the allegation is correct through a retest. If the error is repeated well and good but if it is not repeatable, the voter can face a fine of up to Rs.1,000 and imprisonment of up to 3 months or both. It is a matter of common knowledge that programs can be written to work with random parameters or based on parameters such that without the knowledge of source code, no one can predict if the error will repeat nor when it will repeat. The punishment under rule 49MA - Section 177, should be totally removed as it is illogical, and it works as a deterrent for genuine voter complaints - unless source code is made public, and its auditability allowed before and during elections.  
 
Anything more than above demands in petitions pending in the SCI, may not be feasible to implement in the short time available before the elections. Anything less will not eliminate the threat of the election results getting hijacked.
Manual count in 100% of polling stations may take one week at most for counting which is trivial considering the current schedule which is of 47 days: 44 days for polling + 3 days for counting.

Summary:
Remember the VVPAT hack can be of two types -

  • The vote slip dispensed, and the vote recorded in CU are consistent but NOT according to the vote cast on the BU, therefore, Change # 1 of verification by voter is required
  • The vote slip dispensed is consistent with the actual vote cast, but the vote recorded in CU is NOT, therefore, Change # 2 of rule of manual count compared with CU count and manual count to prevail, is required
  • The possibility of a fraud of replacing the CU and Ballot Box pairs is non-trivial because a RTI based PIL had revealed that whereabouts of many EVM Systems are not known to ECI. Therefore, Change # 3 of rule of transportation is required
  • The punishment should be totally removed as it is based on an illogical premise of predictability of hacked programs, and it deters genuine complaints of voters. If source code is made public, independent auditors can confirm if VVPAT, BU and CU are working as per original program; this will allow citizens to prove hacking else it is NOT provable. Therefore, Change #4 of rule of fines or punishment should be removed or else the source code should be made public and the option of auditability of the source code should be provided
 

Second, the pernicious political funding system which reduces chances of honest and smart candidates winning elections - fixes required

Funding reforms that can be done immediately


  • ECI should mandate 100% disclosure of all funds mobilised by every contestant and every political party. In todays world this is easy and the name of the donor, his identifier, the amount of donation and date should be the minimum data included in the list to be published on the website of the party or individual or ECI provided platform. At present donations below Rs.2,000 need not be disclosed. This loop hole is exploited by parties - one party had claimed that its entire funding was of smaller donations, therefore, not a single name was disclosed!
  • The elections expense caps which apply to contestants should be totally removed. The expense caps are so low that virtually all contestants are forced to tell lies because they spend much more money than is legally allowed. Those who do not have unaccounted (black) money, tend to lose out. The existing system reduces the chances of honest and smart candidates winning elections and it rewards those who have lot of black money and who can manipulate the system and get others to spend on their behalf (with quid pro quo of course). 
  • The State should provide free airtime on its TV channels – national and regional - to all contestants. It should also arrange leading three or four contestants to debate so that voters are better informed before they vote. The moderators can be selected by the candidates themselves. The recorded debates and statements of objects should be made available on ECI's portal.    
 
The above election reforms related to political funding will improve the transparency and reduce costs candidates incur in fighting elections. At the same time the citizens will make more informed decisions and the candidates become more accountable because their statements can be recalled by voters, and their accomplishments, can be compared with their promises or objects.
The reforms that can be done in the next five years (2024 – 2029) – before the General Elections of April-June 2029
In the previous Elections of 2019, of those 900 million eligible voters, 67% voted. The largest share of votes was polled by BJP. With 37.4% vote-share, BJP bagged 303 seats; they can thank India’s First Past The Post (FPTP) system for the disproportionate seat-share of 55.8% (absolute majority) they got. The NDA (National Democratic Alliance) of which BJP was the main partner, polled 45% of the votes and won 353 seats which amounts to 65% seat-share in the 543-member lower house of the Indian Parliament – Lok Sabha (LS).
The Two Round System (TRS) followed by France ensures the winner has at least obtained 50% votes. India uses TRS for President and Vice-President elections but not for legislators in LS or State Assemblies (Vidhan Sabha). With TRS, the Opposition parties with similar ideologies (aka “secular” ideologies), or the types which conflict with the right-wing Sangh Parivar ideology (aka Hindu Supremacist ideology), would have fared better because their votes which get splintered in the first round would likely coalesce in the second round in a one-on-one contest; in TRS, if in the first round no candidate wins over 50% votes, the top two candidates in the first round, get to contest in the second round. Therefore, in TRS, Opposition parties and not BJP would have obtained the majority of seats in the Parliament. The election reform of replacing FPTP system with TRS could ensure a far more representative democracy in India as India has multiple parties and often coalition governments, unlike in USA which has two dominant parties. Even without a pre-poll alliance, the Opposition parties would have defeated the BJP in 2019 – a completely different outcome would have been assured – one which would better reflect the preference of the majority (62.6%) of the voters. The irony is that Modi is pushing forward the reform of “One-Nation-One-Poll” (ONOP) whereas the Opposition has no interest in advocating alternative systems – one wonders if they have any clue about the importance of the TRS in context of INDIA grouping they are trying to create before the 2024 elections?  ONOP, it is argued will save costs and time whereas an online voting system can save far more cost and time. Even while continuing the FPTP system, an online system can easily replace the obsolete EVM System and assure greater security – reliability and cost savings.
 
 
RELATED REFERENCES:
 

Read the "Stuxnet" virus story

how Iran Nuclear fuel processing centrifuges were knocked out by CIA even though Iran's engineers had claimed the plant had "stand alone" systems - just like ECI is claiming their devices are in a "stand alone" state - they allow connecting a SLU before commissioning the system - this is sufficient to infiltrate a rogue program into VVPAT. The hacking can be done selectively - in certain systems only - as all the machines have unique IDs. The rogue program can behave according to a date - time - number of votes cast - schedule - thus defeating the FLC which ECI pompously claims is sufficient proof of proper functioning of the EVM system. They are fooling the public or they are ignorant.

 

EVM System - updated website - new revelations and questions 

(ECI has updated its website pages; new FAQ on 7-Feb-24, Presentation too is changed; probably in response to recent protests and demos of hacking; it has now changed the definition of EVM - earlier it used to mean BU and CU but now it includes VVPAT; so, EVM now cannot be claimed to be OTP device as VVPAT has programmable memory; furthermore EVM System, is more than EVM but ECI is silent on it). 

 

ECI presentation on EVMs - false claims and misrepresentations discussed in this note

 

Are EVM System components OTP type devices? No clear answer from ECI/GOI

 

The hardware in EVM System of today can be easily replaced by Smartphones running a secure App - within weeks

 

Kannan Gopinath's interview on EVM system hackability

Read about the two hack demos. Recently hacks of EVM System were demonstrated and videos shown on 4pm News Network. In these hacks the VVPAT votes differently from the actual votes cast - the slips printed and vote recorded in the CU were consistent. Therefore, the manual count of slips and the count from the CU would match. This type of fraud can only be prevented if Demand#1 is met, else it would require software audit but that is not possible as ECI and SCI have said that software is secret. SCI on the one hand ecourages Open Source - but on the other hand, in this particular instance, it protects the IPR of a ridiculously simple program - GOI can easily get the same software developed in Open Source or buy the IPR for cost which is not likely to exceed few million rupees! Another intriguing thing to read about is that 1.9 Million EVM Systems have gone missing - The Wire article of 22-May-19.

 The Wire article series on multiple issues including EVMs "India Black Boxed":

4-Jan-24 MK Venu

24-Feb-24 Venkatesh Nayak

Challenges to EVM and reaction of authorities

 

EVM Opposition - by senior leaders - call for reforms - urgency ignored by ECI and SCI - 2024 General Elections become fraught

 

Political funding existing in India today is recognised as the fountainhead of corruption: Notes

 

SBI stonewalling SCI - is it perjury and contempt? SCI's honour was at stake - partially redeemed

 

How BJP raises its funds - white (5% to 10%) and black (90% to 95%) - world's biggest and most corrupt party

 

On-line voting and political funding India requires: Blog

 

 

Thursday, February 8, 2024

EVM System usage in 2024 General Elections - minimum demands necessary to place before SCI and ECI

IN A DEMOCRACY PEOPLE GET THE GOVERNMENT THEY DESERVE - BUT WHAT IF THE ELECTION PROCESS IS COMPROMISED?

Anything can be made more complex than it really is. However, the looming threat due to the existing EVM System usage process, coupled with the attitude of ECI and SCI, is so serious and complex that political party leaders, technical experts, lawyers and activists must collaborate. Without collaboration and a unified approach, it will be tough to mount a credible campaign to counter the threat to "purity of the election process".


This note has references to old notes and one new note on an online solution - all links (in orange colour) provided below. Just so that we are clear of the terminology, copied below is the existing EVM usage (graphics copied from ECI website - however, red colour annotations are added):


IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT WITHIN 15 DAYS BEFORE POLLING COMMENCES, SLU IS CONNECTED TO LAP TOP FOR DOWN LOADING THE CANDIDATES + SYMBOLS DATA FROM THE CENTRAL SERVER  AND THEN IT IS INSERTED INTO VVPAT FOR UPLOADING THE SAME - IT IS AT THIS MOMENT, A ROGUE PROGRAM CAN INFILTRATE THE VVPAT AND EVM SYSTEM COMPROMISED. HACKER NEEDS TO SUBVERT ONLY FEW FIELD STAFF IN THOSE BOOTHS WHICH MATTER MOST TO HACKER'S MASTER. AS THERE ARE OVER A MILLION EVMS TO BE COMMISSIONED, WITHIN 15 DAYS, THERE HAS GOT TO BE AN ARMY OF FIELD STAFF HIRED BY ECIL AND BEL. TO SAY THE LEAST, THIS SHOULD BE A SECURITY NIGHTMARE FOR ANY SYSTEM DESIGNER. WHY HAS ECI NOT DISCUSSED THE RISKS IN THIS SORT OF OPERATION IS A QUESTION BEGGING TO BE ASKED. It is also ironical that none of the well-known IT tycoons of India has spoken out about the obsolete design of the "EVM System" and its hackability, instead ECI is flogging the assessments of IIT Professors (on Government's payroll) about the "non-hackability" of the "EVM" (do they even know the difference between the "EVM" and "EVM System", one ought to ask). Just as the rewards or stakes of hacking India's elections bear no comparison with ordinary hacking of an organisation's or an individual's account, expectedly the calibre and organisational wherewithal of the two sets of hacker groups are non-comparable. [Read in the RELALTED links below, the story of Stuxnet virus and ECI presentations and FAQ anomalies and lies] 





In the existing process, this is what happens (or can happen):

  1. An elector (voter) walks into the Polling Station (PS) with an ID proof. S/he walks up to the row of Polling Agents of Political parties and they tick off the name after verifying his/her name on the voters list. If name is not found, the voter is not allowed to vote; s/he is asked to exit the booth.
  2. Indelible ink is smeared on one finger of the eligible voter.
  3. The voter walks up to the Voting Compartment and waits to press a button on the BU to register his/her vote. The BU has the names of contestants and election symbols adjacent to buttons. Max 16 names per BU - they can be daisy-chained.
  4. The Polling Officer with the CU presses a key to enable the BU to register a vote.
  5. The voter pushes a button to register his/her vote after hearing the audio beep that tells everyone that BU is enabled to accept one vote.
  6. VVPAT lights up for 7 seconds during which the voter can see the voting slip with the name of the candidate and symbol. Voter must assume that this slip is not of the previous voter - though there is no telling it could well be of the previous voter - a hacked VVPAT could behave in this manner. If the visible slip is NOT as per the vote cast then the Voter can complain and fill out a a form to nullify the "wrong vote". There is an intimidating process to rectify the error - which includes actions to "prove" that the machines are misbehaving! VVPAT is supposed to write a record of the vote in the CU; a hacked VVPAT could well write a vote in favour of a candidate of hacker's choice.
  7. The voter having cast his/her vote walks out trusting the the vote is recorded correctly in the CU and that the slip s/he saw in the VVPAT has been indeed dispensed in ballot box. It could well be that the the slip has NOT been dispensed in the ballot box nor recorded in the CU. A hacked VVPAT could behave like this - hold all consecutive votes of an adversary party (adversary of the hacker's party) until a vote is cast of a different party - upon that happening, the hacked VVPAT could print and dispense all the votes it had held back, in favour of the hacker's party candidate and also record the votes in the CU consistent with the printed slips!      
 
This note is prepared with the intention to sensitise few more influencers and politicians who can mobilise public opinion against the continuance of the EVM usage in the present form. Regarding the pitch to be made before the ECI/SCI - what exactly should be the demand that is feasible to implement within weeks - to mitigate the risks of hijacking of the 2024 General Elections? We all believe that the outcome of upcoming General Election will be pivotal for the future (secular and democratic) character of the country.

  1. CJI recently said, "The great stabilizing force in the country is the purity of the election process". Ironically, the existing EVM usage process is DEMONSTRABLY HACKABLE - what makes it doubly fraught is that existing rules PREVENT AUDITABILITY and ECI is not prepared to engage with the citizens who have sought a meeting. To repeat - the present processes and rules allow a certain type of hacking to be done and the hack is not provable - this is a mockery of democracy and we should jettison such a set of processes and rules. As ECI is clearly aligned with the Government, it is only the SCI that can provide a solution. If SCI does not grant the following demands, the opposition ought to boycott all elections.

1.1 DEMAND#1 THE VOTER SHOULD BE ABLE TO PICK UP THE SLIP TO VERFIY ITS CORRECTNESS AND THEN PHYSICALLY INSERT IT INTO THE BALLOT BOX.   Or else the voter should be assured that the vote slip coming out of VVPAT, after the vote is cast (by pressing the button on the BU), has the right candidate name and symbol AND it is dispensed into the ballot box. At present the slip is illuminated for 7 seconds behind a one way mirror in the VVPAT and the voter CANNOT EASILY recognise the candidate name or the symbol AND FURTHERMORE, THE VOTER CANNOT FIND OUT IF THE SLIP IS ACTUALLY DISPENSED INTO THE BALLOT BOX. THEREFORE, THE VVPAT SHOULD BE RECONFIGURED (OPENED UP) FOR ENABLING EASY RECOGNITION OF CANDIDATE'S NAME & SYMBOL ON THE SLIP AND ITS DISPENSATION INTO THE BALLOT BOX.

1.2 DEMAND#2 The results should not be based on the count read off from the memory of the Control Unit (CU) rather it should be based on a MANUAL COUNT of 100% SLIPS or RECOUNT IN CASE OF DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE MANUAL COUNT AND THE CU COUNT. To further reduce the chances of errors of the manual count, TWO RECOUNTS MAY BE ORDERED, IF NECESSARY. 

1.3 DEMAND#3 After the Polling finishes, the CU and the Ballot Box pairs are supposed to be transported to the counting station and en route they have to be stored for many hours or even days. ECI has prescribed an elaborate and secure process for transportation and storage but it precludes presence or oversight of contestants' representatives. Fraud can be committed by replacing the sets of the pair of CU and Ballot Box. To mitigate risks - i) CU and Ballot Box pairs should NOT be transported and stored together and ii) Oversight of contestants' representatives should be allowed.

1.4 DEMAND#4 Presently a voter who complains to the Presiding Officer in the Polling Booth that his/her vote is not properly generated, i.e. the VVPAT has printed the wrong vote - is required to prove the allegation is correct through a retest - if the error is repeated well and good but if it is not repeatable, the voter can face a fine of up to Rs.1,000 and imprisonment of up to 6 months or both. It is a matter of common knowledge that hacked programs can be made to misbehave erratically or based on parameters such that without the knowledge of source code, no one can predict if the error will repeat or when it will repeat. The punishment under rule 49MA - Section 177, should be totally removed as it is illogical, and it works as a deterrent for genuine voter complaints - unelsss source code is made public and its auditability allowed before and during elections.  


  1. Anything more than above demands may not be feasible to implement in the short time available before the elections. Anything less will not eliminate the threat of the election results getting hijacked. By getting bar coded slips, the counting process can be hastened by few hours. However, again the hacked VVPAT  could print a bar code different from the correct candidate id / symbol printed on the slip. So further sample audit will be needed and this is avoidable complexity. It is also doubtful if 1 million+ bar code printers can be procured and fitted up in VVPAT in the available time. The demand of junking EVMs and switching over to paper ballot is neither feasible in the short time available nor necessary. There are many advantages of continuting to use the existing infrastructure and processes in which millions of people are trained. The demands listed here are entirely feasible to make and will ensure a FAIR and SAFE process.

  1. Manual count in 100% of polling stations may add one or two days which is trivial considering the elections are conducted for a period longer than a month. The 2019 General Elections were scheduled from 11-Apr-2019 to 19-May-2019. ECI website shows that over one million polling stations were setup. Each BU can accommodate only 16 names, with greater number of contestants more BUs would be required. Each CU has a capacity to record max of 2K votes.

  1. In summary, the demand for software auditability will encompass disclosure of software and its revisions, setting up auditors panel, process of audit challenge by contestants and its resolution - for all of these both SCI ruling and ECI cooperation will be required which may be difficult to obtain. ECI will likely not cooperate with this demand as it is perfectly aligned with GOI. Therefore, absent the software auditability, there is no alternative to the demands formulated above. At least the first two must be acquiesced to - if any one is granted it is not sufficient. Remember the VVPAT hack can be of two types -

    4.1 the vote slip dispensed and and the vote recorded in CU are consistent but NOT according to the actual vote cast (hence demand#1 is made)

    4.2 the vote slip dispensed is consistent with the actual vote cast but the vote recorded in CU is NOT (hence demand#2 is made)

    4.3 The possibility of a fraud of replacing the CU and Ballot Box pairs is non-trivial because a RTI based PIL had revealed that whereabouts of 1.9 Million EVM Systems are not known to ECI.
4.4 The punishment should be totally removed as it is based on an illogical prmise of predictability of hacked programs and it deters gneuine complaints of voters. If source code is made public, independent auditors can confirm if VVPAT  BU and CU are working as per original program; this will allow citizens to prove hacking else it is NOT provable. Therefore, no fines or punishment should be inflicted on a complainant without the option of auditability of the source code.

  

To dig deeper, refer to other notes for which links are copied below.  


RELATED REFERENCES:

Read the "Stuxnet" virus story - how Iran Nuclear fuel processing centrifuges were knocked out by CIA even though Iran's engineers had claimed the plant had "stand alone" systems - just like ECI is claiming their devices are in a "stand alone" state - they allow connecting a SLU before commissioning the system - this is sufficient to infiltrate a rogue program into VVPAT. The hacking can be done selectively - in certain systems only - as all the machines have unique IDs. The rogue program can behave according to a date - time - number of votes cast - schedule - thus defeating the FLC which ECI pompously claims is sufficient proof of proper functioning of the EVM system. They are fooling the public or they are ignorant.

EVM System - updated website - new revelations and questions (ECI has updated its website pages; new FAQ on 7-Feb-24, Presentation too is changed; probably in response to recent protests and demos of hacking; it has now changed the definition of EVM - earlier it used to mean BU and CU but now it includes VVPAT; so, EVM now cannot be claimed to be OTP device as VVPAT has programmable memory; furthermore EVM System, is more than EVM but ECI is silent on it). 





Read about the two hack demos. Recently hacks of EVM System were demonstrated and videos shown on 4pm News Network. In these hacks the VVPAT votes differently from the actual votes cast - the slips printed and vote recorded in the CU were consistent. Therefore, the manual count of slips and the count from the CU would match. This type of fraud can only be prevented if Demand#1 is met, else it would require software audit but that is not possible as ECI and SCI have said that software is secret. SCI on the one hand ecourages Open Source - but on the other hand, in this particular instance, it protects the IPR of a ridiculously simple program - GOI can easily get the same software developed in Open Source or buy the IPR for cost which is not likely to exceed few million rupees! Another intriguing thing to read about is that 1.9 Million EVM Systems have gone missing - The Wire article of 22-May-19 linked.


Wednesday, December 13, 2023

EVM voting & ECI processes - program, data and counting - current vulnerabilities, remedies and action required by INDIA

 

Synopsis: It is said in a Democracy people get the Government they deserve; but what if the Election System - the machines or the processes - are deficient? Then the Government ought to fix it or else the people should agitate to fix the deficiencies. Recent disclosures - as documented by independent journalists and pointed out by activists - show the Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), voting and counting processes in use in India can be manipulated (are hackable). Denying audit challenges is not consistent with democratic norms nor the Constitution of India. The Government, Election Commission of India (ECI) and Courts should accept the citizens' right to know and even provide the means to the contestants to make feasible verifications and allow them to mount audit challenges. The authorities should publish a fair process to allow and resolve contestants' audit challenges. What can be the means and processes for enabling audit challenge which will deter frauds that thwart our democracy?   


In the context of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), how democracy is subverted, or can be subverted, is a question much debated. Concerned citizens have been agitating in India and have met with only limited success - especially now, since all pillars of the Indian democracy seem to be failing in unison.

Election Commission of India (ECI) is a constitutional body supposedly independent of the GOI. However, in reality, a whole lot of processes related with the use of Electronic Voting Machines reveal that GOI is in charge where ECI ought to be in charge. Under the bogey of secrecy for reasons of national security or abdication of judiciary to rule in its domain by calling it the domain of the executive, the democratic processes have been imperiled and even subverted.

People who have little understanding of Information Technology and Digital Security are in charge of designing policies and processes and even SCI has ruled in a way to curtail citizens rights to access programs that ought to be "open source" under the garb of "sensitive", "Intellectual Property" and "Executive Domain". After observing strange coincidences (statistical improbabilities), unexpected electoral results (outside the forecast of all pollsters) and documented anomalies (see articles below in RELATED section), this note references the on-going agitations for fair elections and prescribes what ought to be additional and very important concerns of Indian citizens and actions required for deterring electoral frauds in the future.


PETITION FILED TO ECI to conduct FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS - Citizens campaign, started a few months ago, by concerned citizens - Petition started on 24-Aug-23 by Prof. MG Devasahayam


ADR's recommendations for Electoral Reforms, Political Reforms and Rules for ECI: PDF file from ADRINDIA.org

The above petition and recommendations miss out some of the important issues arising from the points raised in the article of 10-Nov-23 in The Wire by Meetu Jain.

Most importantly, there are three points of hacking that need to be safeguarded against for preventing subversion of the voting and counting process -
i) EVM program hack,
ii) EVM results hack and
iii) results counting by ECI hack.

>>INDIA parties should ask for the following five things in the petitions to ECI and SCI; these steps for transparency are meant to deter voting frauds without forcing withdrawal of EVM or change in any methodology ECI follows in their deployment:

1) Source code of EVM must be shared with public - (this will have to go into a review petition as SCI has already ruled against revealing the source code even to ECI for audit),

2) "Audit Challenge" to discover fraud through any EVM must be resolved through a published process that should include comparing source code of suspect EVM with master copy - can be done by Political Parties/independent auditor,

3) At the Start of voting and after close of voting, the program AND results from each EVM should be allowed to be saved in an external storage by each contestant party for fulfilling the option of an "audit challenge" - each record in the votes cast data file will contain EVM ID, date time stamp, ID of candidate voted for; voter id is not available (so secret ballot is honoured - no one can find out who voted for whom); if there is an "audit challenge" then ECI's database from which results were announced will have to be compared with records saved in external devices submitted by the challenger political party/parties; If ECI aggregates the results filed (entered online manually) by the ECI's Returning Officer (RO) at each constituency, then the audit challenge will involve comparison of the EVM wise Candidate wise counts filed by the RO i.e. the figures from each of the EVMs the RO took into account (see the ECI's counting process note here: link). It should be noted that the data copied from memory stick has only the candidate ID and NOT the name of the candidate; as ECI does not want the results to be known until all voting is completed, in multi-phase and bunched multi-State elections, the password to the list of Candidate ID + Names will be released by the ECI when it wants - i.e. after voting is over; the encrypted list of Candidate names & their IDs will be downloadable from ECI portal by authorized Party representatives and Independent candidates right at start of elections.

4) ECI must have control over randomized distribution of EVMs at State and Constituency levels,
 
5) Sample checking at random of 5% to 30% should always be done of results counted through EVMs and manually of VVPATs.

[For meeting the requirements in point# 2 (detection of program hack) & 3 (detection of "data of EVM results" AND "results transmission & counting by ECI" hacks) EVM could provide a removable memory stick (flash memory card) which can easily hold the copy of the program AND results stored in the internal memory of EVM. Memory sticks have capacities ranging from 1 GB to 1 TB and more. EVM will have to be provided two buttons - "Start" and "End" - when these buttons are pressed, BOTH - the program and results data will be copied into the memory stick - further, only after the Start button is pressed, voting can commence and after the End button is pressed, voting will cease - i.e. the EVM will not be usable for any further voting until it is initialised for next round of election through the existing ECI processes. Using the removable memory stick, the ECI's booth officer and contestants' representatives will be allowed to copy the program + data into their own phones or computers - twice - at the time of Start event and also at the End event]

If these requests (#1 to #4) are denied, all Opposition parties should resist the use of EVMs henceforth and INDIA parties could use Point#5 - for negotiating 100% of VVPAT counting AND for the printed slip to be physically picked up by the voter and for the voter to push it into the box of votes for counting - ONLY the physical count would be treated as the final result - not the EVM memory results (in case they differ). See the hack video in the Notes below on Challenges to EVM and reaction of authorities (presently 5% VVPAT vs EVM counting comparison per constituency has been allowed - this is pointless in view of the hack of EVM + VVPAT actually demonstrated).



Most disconcerting facts and revelations uncovered by the staff of The Wire and reported in the article (verbatim extracts):

(1) In September, the Supreme Court refused to entertain a public interest litigation that asked for an audit of the source code of the Election Commission’s electronic voting machines (EVMs) by an independent agency. While dismissing the case, the court said “there is no material on record to indicate the Election Commission is not fulfilling its mandate.” 

(2) The TEC in fact recommended again and again that the veil of secrecy surrounding source codes should be lifted. In 2013, the TEC said that a facility be provided so the “code in the EVM units can be read out by an approved external unit and the code so read may be compared with corresponding reference code to show that code is same as that in the reference units. The scope of comparision is only to ensure that there is no trojan or other malware for EVMs in use.” 
This report of 2013 was the last the government shared with activist Venkatesh Nayak via RTI. No report has been made public post 2013. 

(3) India’s disproportionate secrecy is in marked contrast to other countries still using electronic voting devices. 

(4) Emails and phone calls to officials of the ECI and spokesperson elicited no response. However, government officials told The Wire, “There is no reason why the source code information should be shared. People have gone to the Supreme Court again and again on this matter and their efforts have been rebuffed. The Election Commission has answered the court each time. These are nothing but motivated questions.” 
Former CEC, Ashok Lavasa, says, “There have been a number of discussions on making source code public though the ECI goes by what the TEC says. The ECI prefers to be guided by academics like those at the TEC and go with their wisdom.” 

(5) In an RTI response to Venkatesh Nayak, BEL admitted that the chip they are using is from US-based NXP semiconductors. In addition, the NXP website says, this is not OTP. Instead, it has three different kinds of memory – SRAM, FLASH AND EEPROM. All three types can erase and rewrite data, or retain data bits in its memory or the memory can be electronically erased and rewritten. In other words, software that can be overwritten or reprogrammed cannot have the safeguards of being one time programmed. 

In a paper on EVMs in 2010, a committee including Michigan University professor Alex J. Halderman had this to say with reference to expert committee members picked for EVMs: “This time the committee members were A.K. Agarwala and D.T. Shahani, with P.V. Indiresan serving as chair. All three were affiliated with IIT Delhi, but, like the first committee, none appear to have had prior computer security expertise. Again, the committee members did not have access to EVM source code and relied on presentations, demonstrations, and site visits with the manufacturers. 

“In their report, the ECI has reiterated its view that the machines were “tamper-proof”. 
In fact, Professor Indiresan is reported to have once said that questioning the ECI’s integrity is like asking Sita to undergo trial by fire.


Observations on the above facts and revelations:

(1) Judgment of SCI is beyond ridiculous - judiciary needs education on the concept of "Open Source" (ironically CJI, DY Chandrachud is a votary of "Open Source" technologies - having introduced a number of open source ICT based innnovations he only needs to be reminded of the benefits of Open Source in a voting system which is plainly a public service system); citizens right to know that fair processes are in place for elections is non-trivial; knowledge of source code cannot compromise national security; policy of executive is violative of citizens right to information; finally the alibi of IPR in not sharing the source code is a big joke - the program for EVM is one a junior programmer can write - even an elevator operations program will be more complex in comparison! 

(2) TEC report of 2013 is absolutely correct - made by competent people of integrity

(3) India can learn from USA, Australia and many other countries before claiming to be mother of democracy - the article cites many examples

(4) ECI boss needs to show some spine, it is doable - s/he can take inspiration from late T.N. Seshan

(5) These so called ECI's tech experts claiming the EVMs are tamper proof and that ECI cannot be questioned - are at best digital illiterates or worse - individuals of compromised integrity - like Sita, they must be subjected to undergo trial by fire!

======================


RELATED

Challenges to EVM and reaction of authorities: Notes
(See the link in the notes to the most ingenious hack - 4pm New Network - viral video)

See in this 5 min video the striking pattern of BJP wins whenever the counting happened after a delay of a week or more of polling; BJP lost more seats whenever the counting happened soon after polling..

Ds4 News clipping of 5M:53S

8-Dec-23 INC TV Chhatisgarh voting % changed by ECI after having announced the voting percentage two days earlier and confirming that EVMs were sealed and placed in a strong room. ADR representative has pointed this out. Reply from ECI? Tweet


Citizens’ Commission on Elections’ Report on EVMs and VVPAT - Report of 11 pages of 8-Apr-21 - recently signed by 6,500 eminent people Report



12-Dec-23 The Wire - Meetu Jain's article on the bill GOI intends to pass that will replace CJI by a Minister of PM's choice in the Committee that appoints CEC and ECs - making ECI totally subservient to the Government: Link

Electoral Reforms India urgently needs - Anil Srivastava's blog:  Link



Thursday, August 3, 2023

Myth of Muslims overtaking Hindus in India - evidence of relative population growths should dispel the contrived fright of many Hindus

 Synopsis:

Worldwide experience and data shows that TFR (Total Fertility Rate - average number of children born per woman of child bearing age) declines with economic well-being and a certain minimum level of "awareness" (children are not "God's gift" - rather the result of unprotected copulation). TFR should be used to project the popluation growth / decline of a group and NOT religion or practices of polygamy etc. followed by its people. The TFR of Muslims in India is higher than that of Hindus today, however, it is declining faster than that of Hindus as the poorer Muslim group is lifted out of poverty. If policies that impinge on economic well-being of groups are non-discriminatory then it is safe to assume that before long, the TFRs of Hindus and Mulims will level up - there is nothing to show that in future, Hindus' TFR will be lower than that of Muslims. Evidence: The Muslim country - UAE's TFR today is 1.5 (lower than 1.6 which is the TFR of few "well-off" States of India - TN, AP, HP, J&K - before the State was broken up) and Yemen's TFR of 3.8 is close to Bihar's TFR, the poorest State - which has TFR of 3.7).  In all likelihood the share of Muslims population in India will peak at 18% and then stay level; in 1951 this share was 10% - it increased due to greater poverty of the Muslims group - not because of religious practices, or some conspiracy; Past Muslim immigrants contributed marginally to the risen share (legal or illegal immigrants "claimed to be" between 4 million and 20 million is about 0.4% to 2% of India's population). [The latest TFR figures for Indian States are lower than quoted above - which are presented for comparison, for e.g. Bihar's TFR has fallen to 3]. 

There are lot of misconceptions people have on the subject of "population explosion" and "Hindu vs Muslim Population growth". This is due to both misinformation and disinformation. The world is changing too fast for many people. Most people are not up to speed with latest data and research, it is inevitable they reach wrong conclusions due to obsolete understanding or worldview they carry in their head (misinformation) or due to agenda driven propaganda (disinformation).

Then there are ignorant (or daft) people who cannot understand that numbers of men and women are nearly always equal and that children are born to women and not men, therefore, population growth should be projected based on average number of children born per woman and not on how many average children a subset of polygamous men has fathered.
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Modi-Shah and Sangh Parivar have run a successful (brain-washing) campaign to frighten Hindus that Muslims will soon overrun them in India and the Muslims are working through a love jihad conspiracy to establish a Muslim Caliphate to rule the world. Most Bhakts have closed their minds to evidence and they are convinced that official statistics are wrong or the data is twisted to hide the rising population of Muslims. These folks believe that in India the proportion of Muslim population has risen manifold since independence (actually the Muslim population proportion has increased from 10% in 1951 - first census - to ~14.2% in 2011 - last census - https://shorturl.at/bwANS ) and now the Muslims are reproducing like rabbits who typically have 5 wives and 25 kids ("ham panch hamare pachhees" - this was Modi's jibe at Muslims in 2002 when he asked rhetorically why should Government provide relief to Muslim rehabilitation camps set up after the communal riots) or they are converting Hindu girls through love jihad or they are infiltrating through borders (Amit Shah called them "termites" that are in need of extermination).  All these beliefs are reinforced through a tsunami of propaganda and fake videos and narratives on social media. As a result even educated Hindus refuse to see the evidence to the contrary.
 
 
First lets understand there is no population explosion any longer in ALMOST ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD. After we have understood the underlying reasons for the phenomenon of population explosion that occurred only in the last couple centuries, we will examine the question of population growth of different groups within a region - groups defined by income levels and groups defined by religion or culture.
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The misinformation of population explosion can be quickly dispelled by watching three video clips of late Dr. Hans Rosling in this note (please go through this note and the short video clips before reading further) :
Dr. Rosling was one the world's top presenters (if you like what he says, buy his book - Factfulness).
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Now lets turn our attention to India and the differences between the factors that determine the population growth of Hindus and Muslims. Here one has to get over a lot of disinformation.
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In 1951 the total population of India was 361 Million and in 2020 it grew to 1,380 Million.
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As Muslims population grew 485% vs Hindus 259% between 1951 and 2020, many people and most of right wingers, led by BJP and RSS leaders, ask  isn't it obvious, "Muslims will overrun Hindus?"
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In 1951, of the total population, Muslims constituted 10% and Hindus 84%. In 2020 the Muslims share was estimated to have risen to 15% and Hindus share fell to 79%. So can't we extrapolate the past trend and conclude that eventually Muslims will be majority and Hindus a minority?
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Population projections should not be made without looking at the underlying factors.
Population growth of a community (or a group) is a function of multiple factors
  • Total Fertility Rate (TFR),
  • Longevity (infant mortality affects this)
  • Migration  i.e. immigration (entering) and emigration (leaving)
  • Conversion (changing over from one group to another).
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If between two groups, Longevity, Migration and Conversion remain similar or vary marginally, then the population growth difference between the two groups can be accounted by differences in TFR ONLY. Lets look at the last three factors first, before we turn our attention to TFR of Hindus and Muslims.
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LONGEVITY, MIGRATION and CONVERSION
In India, the longevity and migration differences between Hindus and Muslims can be assumed to be negligible - whatever migration happened in the past has been accounted in the census. There were claims of 4 to 20 million illegal migrants from Bangladesh - recent surveys revealed less than 2 million (i.e. less than 0.2% of India's population); going forward the numbers of Muslims trying to illegally enter Bangladesh exceeds the number in the reverse direction! References at : The story of Muslim settlers from across the border;  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_immigration_to_India No one has reported any authoritative data of increasing migration of Muslims or increasing longevity of Muslims which is greater than Hindus - so these factors cease to have any influence on future population projections. However, about the figures of continuing conversion, into or out of the two religions, there are lot of controversies but little data. There is one survey conducted by PEW Research in 2020 and it concludes that there is negligible conversion, if at all; there is a net gain of people converting into Hinduism (0.8% addition and 0.7% reduction of Hindu population due to religious conversions). [The relevant portions of the report are copied below (so you may skip reading the full 2020 Pew Research Center Survey or go through it later).]
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In a 2020 Pew Research Center survey of nearly 30,000 adults across India, very few indicated they had switched religions since childhood. Among adults who say they were raised as Hindus, 99% still identify as Hindu. Fully 97% of those raised as Muslims are still Muslims in adulthood. And among Indians who were raised as Christians, 94% are still Christians. Moreover, those who do switch religions tend to cancel each other out; among all Indian adults, for example, 0.7% were raised Hindu but do not currently identify as such, while 0.8% were raised outside of the religion but are now Hindu.
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Interfaith marriage also is rare, and widely frowned upon. In the same survey, 99% of married Hindus, 98% of married Muslims and 95% of married Christians say they have a spouse of the same faith. Similar shares of Hindus and Muslims, as well as 92% of Christians, say their spouse was also raised in their current religion. Furthermore, 82% of Indians say that it is at least somewhat important to prevent women in their community from marrying someone of another religion, and 81% said the same for men, including about two-thirds who say each is very important.
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POLYGAMY is NOT a relevant factor for projecting population growth - this is misinformation.
Many people erroneously believe that communities that permit multiple wives (polygamy) grow faster. Most people have a patriarchal view in their head, therefore, they imagine a family led by a male and count the family members while calculating population growth. In a matriarchal view, a person would imagine a woman head and ask the question how many family members exist per family of the woman. In fact what matters is the number of children born per woman and the total number of women in the community; it doesn't matter whether the woman is married to 1 or 0.5 or  0.01 men (matriarchal view) or  1 man with one wife, one man with two wives or one man with 100 wives (patriarchal view) - BOTH ARE SAME. Generally in all communities, there are equal number of males and females. So if few males take many wives, there will be many males without wives at any point of time. This does not in any way alter the fact that the population will only grow depending upon the average number of children born per woman x total number of women. Since the ratio of men and women is likely same across all religions, what really matters is the TFR difference between the religions. See the link below about Ziona family picture - 39 wives or 1/39 Husband?
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TOTAL FERTILITY RATE
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TFR is the average number of children born per woman of child bearing age. TFR of 2.1 IN A GROUP is considered replacement level, i.e. the population remains steady (additions equal deaths) - Experts agree that today, TFR higher than 2.1 would result in population increasing over time and lower than 2.1 would result in population declining over time.
According to UN, India's TFR has been steadily reducing and it has now touched 2.1. For Hindus and Muslims in India, the migration and conversion are negligible, the differences in longevity are also negligible, therefore, future population growth of Hindus and Muslims will be determined by their respective TFRs over time.
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TFR Religion wise in Table 4.2 Page#124 of Vol I
Hindu TFR = 1.94; Muslim TFR (highest) = 2.36; Jain TFR (lowest) = 1.60



State and UT wise TFR Table 4.3 page#125 of Volume I
Muslims high proportion States J&K TFR = 1.41; Kerala TFR = 1.79; WB TFR = 1.64
Hindu high proportion States UP TFR = 2.35; Bihar TFR = 2.98
Per capita income rather than religion would explain the above differences in TFR






The FUTURE: As per the TOI article from which above population figures for India are quoted, India's  population is likely to peak at 1.6 Billion in 2045-50; Muslims share will peak at 18% and Hindus will still be the majority at 77%.
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So it is a myth that Muslims will overrun Hindus in India - this will never happen. Though the TFR of Hindus is slightly lower than that of Muslims at present, the rate of decline of Muslim's TFR is higher than that of Hindus. Therefore, the two TFRs will level up or it is possible that Muslims TFR may decline below that of Hindus.
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TOI article of 10-Jun-22 written by Rohan Rohit, Editor of TOI and ET is included in the following note (the excellent article explains the methodologies used for projection and it is worth a read). Also included are State wise TFR figures and Hindu Muslim Population shares as per 2011 Census. The 2021 Census was not conducted due to pandemic.
 
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The above are just two of viral WhatsApp messages tsunami in India that is created and sustained by the digital army of BJP.
 
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Scroll down to the  amazing Ziona family picture in this note:
 
 
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TFR in MENA & N. AFRICA regions has already declined to about the replacement level.

UAE is an affluent Muslim country - its TFR (in 2021) is down to 1.5! Yemen is a poor Muslim country - its TFR (in 2021) is 3.8.
 
 
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BEST & WORST NEWS:
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World will be a better place without religion. Therefore, it is worth noting that the importance of religion and religiosity is declining rapidly with enlightenment. The fastest growing group in the world today, after "Islamists" (followers of Islam) is that of atheists and the irreligious - i.e. unaffiliated people. It is certain that with reducing poverty in the "Islamists" group, their TFR will decline and then the highest rate of growth will be that of "unaffiliated group" and it is this group which will be the dominant one before the end of 21st Century. Bad news is that before that happens, the human race could suffer a cataclysmic catastrophe if it does not learn to avoid a nuclear war or if it continues to degrade the environment and crosses the tipping point beyond which climate change becomes unmanageable: Read about the doomsday clock at the link below in RELATED articles. RATHER THAN WORRY ABOUT ISLAMISTS TAKING OVER THE WORLD WE SHOULD BE WORRIED ABOUT SAVING ORGANISED HUMANITY WHICH IS FACING AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT!
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Unaffiliated group is likely to become the fastest growing one after the Islamists in poor countries are lifted above the abject poverty line.
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Twenty most atheist countries of world (%'s vary from 27% to 52% - economically well off tend to become atheists):  Source (26-Apr-23): https://shorturl.at/hyEO1
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RELATED
 
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======  DOOMSDAY CLOCK   =======
Humans worst instincts are overtaking the world:
There are more important existential issues than Hindu - Muslim population growths. Today is the most dangerous moment in history - 90 seconds to midnight on the doomsday clock of atomic scientists reminds us of the danger.
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