Saturday, November 14, 2026

Existing voting system is vitiated - without certain tweaks, citizens must reject it


In any election cycle, of MP or MLA, the EVM system is NOT standalone as is made out by ECI (Election Commission of India). DEO/RO has a laptop which must login to ECI server via Internet. Malware can be infiltrated into the laptop knowingly or unknowingly. From the laptop, via SLU, the malware payload can enter VVPAT. ECI asserts VVPAT does not have any operating system to allow malware to execute. ECI does admit the VVPAT has 4MB of programmable memory into which candidate number, name and Symbol data is copied. Afterwards there is ample free memory into which malware payload can sit. ECI has stonewalled audit of EVM at system level and SCI has allowed ECI to maintain secrecy. SCI itself uses and encourages open source software but strangely, it holds BEL and ECIL (two PSU suppliers of EVMs) as secret. It is totally illogical to argue that revealing technical design or source code will compromise security of the voting system; it has no scientific basis. Conceding the bogus secrecy requirement, the following changes are recommended that will make the voting system more reliable without any disclosures of technical design or source code. Logically, there should be no excuse by ECI to accept these tweaks.

Abbreviations used:
EVM - Electronic Voting Machine (ensemble of three interconnected units - BU, CU and VVPAT)
BU - Ballot Unit (Has buttons for voting - Candidate Name, Symbol are pasted - on paper)
CU - Control Unit
VVPAT - Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail - has opaque plastic cover with a small square dark glass and a ballot box into which paper slips fall - max 2K voter slips
SLU - Symbol Loading Unit - has a USB cable - used by field staff to copy candidate name and Symbol file, from laptop of DEO (or RO), which is copied into VVPAT in two weeks before polling
DEO/RO - District Election Officer/Returning Officer (often an IAS level officer) - has access to ECI's central server via Internet to download the candidate name and Symbol file.
EPIC - Elector's Photo Identity Card (aka Voter ID Card)

Tweak required
Why required?
Fraud/Failure being prevented
  1. Inside the VVPAT, the LED lamp must remain constantly lit instead of 7 seconds after the vote is cast by pressing a button on the BU
The voter can see a printed slip with the candidate's number and election symbol after they press a button on the BU. They CANNOT TELL IF THE SLIP THEY ARE SEEING IS NOT THE PREVIOUS VOTER'S SLIP. VVPAT can be made to misbehave by injecting a malware into its programmable memory (of 4MB via the SLU) to deceive voters and steal consecutive votes cast for opponents by printing them in favour of the hacker's party, when the lamp is switched off. Dig deeper: Foiling EVM Hacking - it is easy if two processes and one rule are changed; Voting with EVMs in polling booths - current system and proposed system after Aadhaar is linked with EPIC.
By the subterfuge of infecting a SLU which in turns infects VVPAT, a whole constituency's results can be upended. No audit will reveal the fraud because the malware can self-destruct before poll closing and the VVPAT slip count will match the CU count.
  1. Electoral roll must have an additional column next to EPIC number - for Aadhaar ID of every elector. Both EPIC and Aadhaar number must be unique across all electoral rolls - across the country.
At present an elector's name can exist in the Electoral Roll WITHOUT an EPIC number, since that is allotted afterwards! This is a defective process - the ERONET can be easily modified (backend software). ECINET must also allow queries by EPIC (front-end software). Aadhaar must be made mandatory and the first time it is introduced into the record of a voter (in ECI's database), it must be authenticated online using biometrics (fingerprint or iris or facial recognition). The ECI's programs must ensure the EPIC and Aadhaar are unique in electoral rolls of the WHOLE country - not just one constituency. Dig deeper: Voting with EVMs in polling booths - current system and proposed system after Aadhaar is linked with EPIC; Fraud in Electoral Rolls preparation - Voters List can include fakes and delete genuine voters - Part 1/3.
Duplicate voters or masquerading voters, in place of deceased persons or someone else, can enter the electoral rolls and upend the results of any constituency.
  1. Form 17-C should be signed and uploaded immediately after poll closing, on ECI portal for public viewing
Photo of filled up and signed Form 17-C should have the digital Mac Id (machine id) of the CU. This photo will reveal the number of votes cast at each booth. On the day of counting, the representatives of candidates in the counting room can compare the counts and ALSO the CU machine ID - no discrepancy must be allowed. ECI is known to release divergent figures of votes - this must not be tolerated. Dig deeper: Sharing Form 17-C with citizens - vulnerability and mitigating FRAUD; ECI is stonewalling by offering specious and technically absurd reasons; Foiling EVM Hacking - it is easy if two processes and one rule are changed.
Manipulations in Form 17-C and even substituting the EVMs (like CU and VVPAT) can happen after poll closing.
  1. Electoral Rolls with photos of electors, must be released by ECI in searchable pdf format. Until recently, these were provided in scanned pdf files. After protests, ECI agreed to release rolls in searchable pdf files but without photos.
Citizens cannot search their names without spending enormous amounts of time. These files should be searchable on ECI website by filtering constituency and polling station names. Photo, EPIC and Aadhaar number should be visible and searchable too. This will in no way diminish security or impinge on privacy of voters as argued by ECI. Dig deeper: Fraud in Electoral Rolls preparation - Voters List can include fakes and delete genuine voters - Part 1/3; Voters List - ECI designs and prints this.
Manipulations in electoral rolls escape notice and voters can get deleted and also their particulars (like name) misspelt without the voters finding out. At the time of voting they can be denied voting due to discrepancies.

Conclusion: Citizens, Activists and all responsible Political Parties must demand above fixes in the voting system immediately, failing which ECI must be forced to revert to paper ballots. Special Intensive Revision that ECI is conducting is a charade for creating NRC (National Register of Citizens) that Government ought to undertake after one-way seeding of EPIC database with Aadhaar number. ECI had completed over 50% seeding when it stopped; it should resume the exercise after putting in place the necessary legislative support.

For the full list of reforms I recommend - Electoral and Voting System Reforms - read my  Blog updated May 2026 ~ Anil Srivastava, System Designer and Software Entrepreneur since 1972.

 

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