By Anil Srivastava | Full
Blog Post | November 8, 2025 – Updated May 7, 2026
Overview
Indian elections are beset with serious problems at multiple
levels — ironically, all of these can be fixed. The biggest reason reforms
haven't happened is the lack of public pressure. Some fixes require
constitutional amendments with a 2/3rd majority, a few require legislative
amendments with a simple majority, and others require only a procedural change
which could be mandated by ECI (Election Commission of India) or forced by SCI
(Supreme Court of India).
ECI, once a reputed independent institution, is today seen
as a government agent. SCI has been generally dismissive of activists'
challenges against ECI's processes and conduct. Therefore, it is only public
pressure that can save India's democracy.
Reform Table: All 11
Vulnerable Stages
(S=Short-term, M=Medium-term,
L=Long-term | E=Essential, D=Desirable)
Sr. 1 [L & E] —
Political Funding & Accountability of Contestants
Vulnerability: Unrealistically low expense caps force
candidates to mobilise funds under the table, entailing quid pro quos. Honest
candidates are sidelined. Wild promises are made with no accountability.
Humongous election rallies cause public inconvenience.
Fix: Expense caps to be raised 10x with full
transparency in disclosures. Political parties must disclose 100% of funds.
Donors above a threshold must disclose all government contracts. State to
provide broadcast time and organise moderated debates. Physical rallies capped
at two per candidate and five per party. ECI to publish candidate statements of
objects and past performance in easy-to-read searchable tables.
🔗 Deep dive: World's
biggest election | Costliest
election | Political
party proliferation
Sr. 2 [L & D] —
First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) System
Vulnerability: With multiple parties, FPTP distorts
representation — winning parties often have minority voter support. Dummy
candidates are propped up with slush funds to split opposition votes.
Fix: India should replace FPTP with a Two-Round
System (TRS) or Proportionate Representation System, ensuring winning
candidates always have >50% vote share.
🔗 Deep dive: FPTP
vs TRS which is better for India?
Sr. 3 [M & E] —
Scheduling of Elections (Phase-wise)
Vulnerability: ECI announces election phases without
consulting major parties and appears to follow the ruling party's demands. The
last General Election stretched to 42 days.
Fix: ECI must adopt a transparent, consultative
approach to phase scheduling with all major parties.
Sr. 4 [M & E] —
ECI Appointment of Election Commissioners & Immunity
Vulnerability: All three ECs are appointed by PM
& Cabinet with little say for the Leader of Opposition (LOP). ECI becomes
partisan and beholden to the ruling party. ECs face no accountability for their
conduct or violations of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).
Fix: Appointment committee should comprise PM + Chief
Justice of India (CJI) + LOP. ECs must be made accountable and prosecutable for
acts of both commission and omission.
🔗 Deep dive: ECI
beholden to Government LOP
has little say
Sr. 5 [S & E] —
Electoral Rolls Preparation & EPIC (Electors Photo ID Card) Issuance
Vulnerability: Very poor system design with no use of
India's DPI (Digital Public Infrastructure). Huge errors — ~17% dubious
additions in one Assembly Constituency; 6,000 names attempted to be
programmatically deleted in another. Duplicate EPICs and entries in Electoral
Rolls without EPICs abound. ECI refuses to release digital searchable rolls
citing false legal reasons (it releases scanned pdf files for no good reason).
Fix:
- Aadhaar
must be mandatorily linked with EPIC (legislative support needed; ~650
million already seeded).
- EPIC
generated only after biometric Aadhaar authentication; both EPIC &
Aadhaar numbers must be printed in Electoral Roll.
- EPIC
to carry current address (determining constituency), separate from
permanent address. This will enable migrant workers (tens of millions) to
vote from their current addresses.
- Deletion
process made rigorous: requester identity authenticated biometrically; ID
& IP stored; suspicious high-speed deletion attempts referred to NIA (National
Investigation Agency).
🔗 Deep dive: Wrongful
additions & deletions | Indian
Citizen vs Voter explainer | Linking
Aadhaar with Voter Card |
Sr. 6 [S & E] —
Polling Booth Voter Identification
Vulnerability: Photos in Electoral Rolls are of very
poor quality and miniscule size, allowing impersonators to pass scrutiny of
Polling Assistants (PAs) and Presiding Officer (PO).
Fix: Identity must be established via biometric
Aadhaar authentication. All booths to be equipped with fingerprint scanners and
facial recognition (ECI to develop an app). At least one iris scanner per
polling station. Satellite phones/VSAT kits for remote areas. Two fallback
biometric methods to ensure no genuine voter is excluded.
🔗 Deep dive: Voting
system before and after EPIC linked with Aadhaar
Sr. 7 [S & E] —
Physical Electoral Roll & Ink-Smearing Process
Vulnerability: Errors occur in manually marking
voters on physical rolls and recording serialised numbers. The process is
antiquated and error-prone.
Fix: Eliminate physical Electoral Rolls entirely.
ECI's Voter Management System (VMS) to provide booth-specific electronic voter
lists to logged-in PAs (Polling Agents) and POs (Presiding Officer) on
smartphones/tablets. PO/PA to mark authenticated voters electronically; VMS
records EPIC in a "Votes Cast" table. Indelible ink smearing becomes
unnecessary as the system prevents double-voting automatically.
🔗 Deep dive: Voting
system before and after EPIC linked with Aadhaar
Sr. 8 [S & E] —
Voting with the EVM System
Vulnerability: EVM is a "black box" —
source code and technical design not revealed. The dark glass + 7-second lamp
design of VVPAT means voters cannot reliably verify their vote slip being
printed and dispensed. A gamed VVPAT can steal votes with no proof, as the
malware self-erases before poll closing leaving no audit trail. ECI has also
ordered CCTV footage deleted after 45 days.
Fix:
- VVPAT
must have transparent glass with the inside lamp constantly lit so
voters can see the slip printing and being dispensed into the ballot box.
- On
polling day, in 2% of booths per constituency (chosen by
contestants), EVMs to be removed for Black Box Testing (BBT) —
simulated voting at real pace, with worksheet results compared against CU
display and printed slip count. Discrepancies to trigger investigation or
countermanding of election. A pattern favouring one party may lead to
disqualification.
- CCTV
footage must be shareable with contestants to verify the maximum 4-votes-per-minute
EVM rule. ECI's deletion policy is described as mala fide.
🔗 Deep dive: EVM
usage & vulnerabilities | Voting
system overview
Sr. 9 [S & E] —
Poll Closing Processes & Form 17-C
Vulnerability: After polling closes, the PO is
supposed to record in Form 17-C, total votes as displayed on CU, timestamp and serial
numbers of CU, BU and VVPAT. The filled-up
Form-17C is supposed to be signed by PO and PAs. If fraudulently, higher vote
count and timestamp is recorded on Form-17C then the extra votes could be cast by
the PO; as a precaution, to escape audit enquiry, the PO could tick off names
of those who had not voted, on physical electoral roll. Delays and fudging in manual
submission, without a photograph of CU display of vote count and poll closure
time, undermine integrity.
Fix:
- CU
display fields (total votes, serial number, date-time stamps) and VVPAT
serial number to be photographed and uploaded to ECI portal immediately.
- Form
17-C, signed by all present, to be photographed and uploaded to ECI
portal.
- Total
booth votes with CU & VVPAT serial numbers to be input online on ECI
portal (with male-female breakup).
🔗 Deep dive: Form
17-C, process modifications for preventing fraud
Sr. 10 [S & E] —
DEO Submission to ECI After Form 17-C Collection
Vulnerability: The District Election Officer (DEO)
compiles booth-wise votes from Form 17-C and files on ECI portal — but there is
inadequate verification of accuracy.
Fix:
- DEO
to verify booth-wise votes by cross-checking physical Form 17-C against
PO-uploaded photos.
- ECI's
VMS to generate a digitally signed (DSC) statement of booth-wise votes
within 24 hours of poll closing.
- All
contestants to be able to view booth-wise totals with filters on ECI
portal.
Sr. 11 [S & E] —
Vote Counting in the Counting Room
Vulnerability: In the counting room, booth-wise
candidate results are read off each CU. There is currently no systematic check
that the physical CU being counted is the same machine used at the booth —
creating a window for EVM substitution or tampering.
Fix: Before reading results from each CU,
contestants' representatives must be given an opportunity to verify the CU's
displayed serial number against Form 17-C, the tamper-proof sticker with serial
number on VVPAT, and uploaded photos. Any discrepancy must halt counting for
that constituency and trigger an investigation.
Most Important Short-Term & Essential (S & E) Reforms
As concluded in the blog, the following items can
significantly reduce risks to India's democracy quickly and should be
prioritised:
Sr. 5 — Electoral Roll cleanup via mandatory
Aadhaar-EPIC linking and biometric-authenticated deletions (especially
sub-action 5.4)
Sr. 6 — Biometric voter authentication at booths
using Aadhaar
Sr. 7 — Replace physical Electoral Rolls with
electronic VMS-based system; eliminate ink smearing
Sr. 8 — Fix VVPAT transparent glass; introduce Black
Box Testing in 2% of booths; share CCTV footage with contestants (especially action
8.2 to thwart EVM hacks)
Sr. 9, 10 & 11 — Digital upload of Form 17-C, DEO
verification, and serial number cross-check before counting — to thwart all
post-poll gaming
By utilising India's excellent Digital Public Infrastructure
(DPI) coupled with tweaking the Aadhaar Act and making minor changes in VVPATs,
India's democracy can be quickly secured. Subversion of Indian elections is a
high-stakes game — if hacking/manipulation is being done, it is likely done by
top-drawer hackers who will not leave an audit trail.
The two longer-term structural reforms — Sr. 1
(political funding transparency) and Sr. 2 (replacing FPTP) — remain
critical but require much broader public debate and constitutional/legislative
action over time.
